Bringing in some extra muscle can stop a fight from escalating into an all-out war. Just as Saudi Arabia invited the US to put Saddam Hussein back in his place after he invaded Kuwait in the 1990’s, the Saudis are now turning to Pakistan for a little extra support in their efforts to battle the Yemeni Houthi uprising. At the very least, the Saudis hope their willingness to bring in a heavy-hitter will intimidate Iran enough to cease its alleged support of the Houthi rebels.
As wealthy Saudi Arabia and densely-populated Pakistan have Sunni majorities, both countries have common interests that can be addressed through economic and military cooperation. Given Yemen is home to one of Al Qaeda’s most active branches and Pakistan has been struggling with Al Qaeda, as well as the Taliban, for years, they also have a common enemy in Al Qaeda and the common need to stabilize their own dysfunctional neighbors. Where Saudi Arabia conflicts with Iran on a multitude of issues, the Pakistani-Iranian relationship is much friendlier. In accordance, the last thing Iran wants to do is start a fight with the much larger, nuclear Pakistan. Although intervention in Yemen on behalf of Pakistan could create friction between the two neighbors, the presence of Pakistani troops would make it far more costly for Iran to influence Yemen. Because Pakistan gets financial support from Saudi Arabia and the globalizing Sunni populations of both countries identify with the plights of each other, Pakistan needs to avoid conflict over failing to support Sunni efforts in Yemen.
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How the West needs to engage the Middle East has been rapidly changing since the failures of poorly devised Western engagement and unresponsive governance throughout the region erupted into the Arab Spring Revolutions. Recognizing the number of deeply entrenched issues the populations of the Middle East face, along with the constant influx of new crises emerging throughout the region, the traditional diplomatic “architecture” used to guide how we engaged the region could no longer be effective.
During the Arab Spring Revolutions, this writer advocated for greater diplomatic engagement and assistance in helping the Peoples of the Middle East redevelop their political institutions. Instead of reacting to crises, military intervention needed to be a last resort while intervening to favor existing governments could no longer be the motivation. The West needed to wait and strategically engage emerging crises in order to stretch limited resources that could not meet all of the needs. Since the rise of the Islamic State as a major regional threat, the governments of the Middle East have become increasingly responsive to their own security needs while recognizing of the need to preserve their nation-states instead of using their power to simply serve their own whims. What this means is that elements of traditional diplomatic architecture, which assumes a government will pursue its interests as a nation and as a reflection of its People’s collective interests, can be properly used to engage the Middle East. Accordingly, support of government policies can fulfill the interests of Middle Eastern leaders and their Peoples in such a way that it also serves Western interests. The Syrian Civil War may soon be entering a new stage. Unfortunately, for Palestinians taking refuge in Camp Yarmouk near Damascus, those who have not been able to flee will be subject to the oppression of the Islamic State. Fortunately, for those battling the Assad regime for control of Syria, there may be one less enemy on the battlefield very soon.
As the Islamic State’s push into the refugee camp made the news, Iraqi troops were celebrating victory over the Islamic State in the city of Tikrit. Given mounting victories by various groups fighting IS, most notably the retaking of Kobani by Kurdish fighters, and the economic infeasibility of the Islamic State “caliphate, IS may be pushed out of Iraq and corralled into a major battle with the Assad regime. What is slowly unfolding is, of course, similar to the strategy this writer proposed in the summer of 2014. The question is whether the Islamic State will attempt to hold onto all of the territory it controls or divert reinforcements to key cities like Mosul and Damascus while they have a chance to do so. Following their failure in Kobani, the Islamic State will likely be reluctant to commit too resources to one city. After all, it just makes them an easier target for Coalition airstrikes and they have learned some lesson from their experience. |
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April 2020
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