Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has expressed his frustrations over the lack of material gains in terms of sanctions relief. Although he will currently allow nuclear talks to move forward and his message could be a way of pressuring the West to prematurely ease sanctions, which would be a misinterpretation of Western interests as preventing Iran from being able to build a nuclear weapon is a far more vital national interest than partnering and coordinating with Iran on regional issues, it would appear moderate President Hassan Rouhani is losing political support, which means his broader effort to reconcile Iran’s differences with the US and much of the Western is threatened. This, of course, also means his domestic agenda of rebuilding Iran is also under siege.
Looking at the Supreme Leader’s call for Muslims around the world to aid Hamas in its fight against Israel at the end of July, it also appears the true power in Iran prioritizes its ability to expand its regional influential in the short-term over healing its democratic economy through normalized relations with the West as this writer has discussed in previous posts. Given growing instability throughout the Middle East, which can only be addressed with the aid of some Western intervention, Israel’s threats to bomb Iran over its ambition, Iran’s own internal civil unrest, which it managed to suppress the largest outbreak of public dissent in 2009, the Supreme Leader would be wise to recognize building a functional relationship with the US will take a great deal of time and involve Iran shifting some of its core nuclear priorities, especially since failing to do so will hurt Iran’s ability to respond to threats to its own stability.
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Leading up to the start of the Ukrainian Crisis and the invasion/annexation of Crimea by Russia, there were many, including this writer, who looked favorably on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to expand Russian soft power to the benefit of the Intentional Community as exemplified by his role in addressing the Syrian Civil War through peace talks and the sheltering of whistleblower Edward Snowden. With the advent of the Ukrainian Crisis, hopes of greater constructive international engagement on behalf of Russia were dashed. Although the West largely views Putin’s twisting of the realities in Ukraine as ridiculously unbelievable and thoroughly divisive, this interpretation is not necessarily shared globally.
People process information intellectually and emotionally, but they also interpret novel facts, concepts, and real-time events intuitively. This means most people, most of the time, react to news in ways consistent with their own preconceived notions and personal experiences instead of properly analyzing the data as part of broader framework, even when there are obvious contradiction with their beliefs and the facts. This is seen in American politics where ideologically aligned news firms like Fox and MSNBC attract likeminded viewers with clearly biased commentary, often rationalized to be objective news stories. As such, it takes a great deal of evidence and proper framing for most people to react differently to news that contradicts their views. Consequently, Russia’s PR campaign may not be effective in the West, but it has been a way for Putin to continue to build Russian soft power and credibility elsewhere. Offering humanitarian aid to Eastern Ukraine is very much a great way for Putin to reframe the Ukrainian Crisis in terms favorable to Russian interests, including his efforts to aggressively expand and intensify its influence. In the wake of Russia’s self-imposed sanctions against Western agricultural goods, which the West essentially mocked as the ban does more to hurt Russian consumers while bolstering the effects of Western sanctions, Russian food aid is also a means of depicting a strong Russia so unreliant on Western goods and capable of providing for its own needs that it can give generously to Ukrainians supposedly being brutalized by its Western-backed government. That said, the thoroughly valid fear of a Russian humanitarian mission being used to implement a military operation clearly would drive the Ukrainian government to resist Russian aid, thus Putin has engineered a situation where Ukraine fulfills Russia’s portrait of the former Soviet state under siege. Although it is too soon to tell if Putin is actually preparing for an invasion or engineering a way for Russia to deescalate the crisis without admitting wrongdoing, this latest Russian gesture was clearly designed to agitate and vilify Western powers. Despite Putin’s success with using Edward Snowden’s NSA revelations to vilify America for the reckless overreach of our national security apparatus, making Russia look good at the expense of others is not the best way to bolster Russian soft power, especially when the West is heavily sanctioning Putin’s government and associates. Most of America’s minor international partners are fickle when it comes to their loyalty to the United States, but this is because we live in a capitalist world where governments have been trained to continually seek out whatever partnerships and opportunities best support their interests. As such, a PR loss for America is not necessarily a PR gain for Russia, though continued broken relations with the West is definitely a major loss for Russia. Even though US airstrikes and the arming of Kurdish Peshmerga forces are helping hinder the advancement of Islamic State militants, politics continues to prevent the leadership needed for a coherent strategy to emerge. As newly nominated Prime Minister Haider Abadi works to form a new government and lame duck prime minister Nouri al-Maliki fights to stay in power, the political establishment is far from reaching a point where it can even start developing, let alone implementing, a governance strategy capable of restoring order and shared, responsive governance. At the moment, the only major contribution to stop the collapse of Iraq by the Iraqi government has been al-Maliki’s efforts to position himself for a power grab, without regard for broad parliamentary and international support of Abadi, under the guise of a coup threat, thus creating an eventual need for the Prime Minister to institute emergency powers should the legal system fail him. In the United States, bipartisan Congressional support for intervention is fairly solid with most vocal critics of Obama’s policies demanding greater intervention, yet necessary dissent is not being heard to the detriment of the emerging military mission. The instinct of most politicians is to use their constituent’s emotions to garner support for policies they support. Tax policy, for example, is often transformed from an economic debate into an emotionally charged fight by politicians who frame taxes as punishment for earning too much and businessmen who seek in a self-serving manner to legitimize their efforts to minimize their tax burden by complaining with “how-would-you-feel” statements over sound policy debates aimed at doing what is best for all Americans. In the case of Iraq, strong emotions over the sacrifice of American servicemen and women, as well as fears rooted in the September 11th terrorist attacks, muddy the need for an intervention strategy that does not set the US up for yet another doomed mission in Iraq. Although humanitarian concerns are rooted in an emotional response, intervention to save civilians and prevent genocide as in the case of around 50,000 Yazidis under siege by Islamic State fighters, is part of America’s broader, long-term interests in maintaining an international order where stability and diplomacy prevent widespread armed conflicts between nations. Ironically, Congressional efforts, on the behalf of both Republicans and Democrats, to hinder limited military intervention in Syria, which this writer favored in regards to airstrikes against the Assad regime’s military, paved the way for a far broader, more costly intervention now. The inevitable collapse of Iraq, which this writer also predicted when the George W. Bush’s so-called “military surge” failed to address the social issues driving Iraq’s internal strife, is being confounded with the spread of the Islamic State. While it seems individuals like al-Maliki are banking on the unwillingness of the US to allow his government to collapse no matter who is in charge and how Iraq is ruled, America’s vital national interests in Iraq are the threat of globalized terrorism and the destabilization of the region. There is no vital national interest in propping up Iraqi’s dysfunctional government at all costs. Quite frankly, Iraq is just one country where a radical group like the Islamic State can create instability and undermine other American interests. This means an American intervention strategy aimed at dealing with the advance of the Islamic State must focus on degrading its military prowess as well as boosting national/regional forces aligned with US interests. Ignoring the plight of Syria for too much intervention in Iraq, for example, would be too costly and too ineffective for the US as the Islamic State would simply retreat to fight another day in another land while doing so would do nothing to secure the region, except reinforce the dysfunctional, self-serving behavior of Iraq’s political elites. Democracy does not ensure a nation’s success, thus elections cannot solve a lack of proper governance nor any other problems while politics tends to be a source of problems for democracies as they do not readily allow the suppression of dissent. It is leadership and problem solving that allows problems to be solved. On the other hand, nondemocratic and ill-democratic governments are far more susceptible to the self-serving tendencies of “power seekers.” As such, elections are a means of removing ineffective and counterproductive leadership from government. In the case of Iraq, President Fouad Massoum’s nomination of Deputy Parliament Speaker Haider Abadi to be Iraq’s next prime minister over incumbent Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose efforts to consolidate and solidify power undermine his ability to build a government of consensus, represents a serious obstacle to Iraqi democracy and governance.
Quite frankly, Iraq is under siege by the militant Islamic State and the only reason the Islamic State has not been able to continue its rapid takeover of Iraqi territory is largely due to recent US bomb strikes aimed at destroying the militant’s heavy artillery, which they acquired during the capitulation of the Iraqi army, and the valiant efforts of the under- armed Kurdish Peshmerga forces. Consequently, politics is the last thing Iraq’s leadership should be concerned about. The instinct of a nation confronting a crisis should be to come together, so everyone is focused on problem solving, yet Iraq’s government is not. In many respects, the failure of Iraq’s political leadership to do this is a reflection of American political leadership’s, including both Democrats and Republicans, failure to teach by example how a mature, functional government needs to behave when faced with the practical issues of governance. At the same time, al-Maliki represents a great deal of the problem. Because there is a lack of confidence, as well as trust, in al-Maliki’s leadership, he cannot lead the Iraqi government, military, and People. Instead of resigning weeks ago, al-Maliki is now placing himself in a position where his efforts to retain power will undermine the Iraqi government even more. All power seekers legitimize, consolidate, and solidify their power. Where a legal system rooted in a constitution is supposed to be about creating order by formalizing what society’s deems legitimate behavior, al-Maliki is using vagueness and technicalities he helped build into Iraqi law to legitimize his efforts to remain in power. Most unfortunately, al-Maliki is even using his corruption of the Iraqi military to force his rule onto the rest of Iraq’s elected leaders. In doing so, he is actually implementing a coup against his fellow lawmakers, transforming his followers into a separatist faction analogous to the Islamic State, and cementing Iraq as an ill-democratic nation doomed to split up from a lack of proper governance. For those who do not fundamentally believe in the value of true democracy and/or value their interests above the need to balance the interests of all Peoples within a nation, there is an inherit choice when it comes to governance and democracy. In truth, democracy’s strength is its long-term ability to ensure the wildly diverse interests of a population can be heard and adequately addressed; whereas, non-democratic forms of government tend to cater to the views of small groups of elites. Non-democratic forms of government have the short-term strength of suppressing disruptive oppositions, thus it is always tempting for even those who do support democracy to indulge autocratic rule when politics creates problem. Al-Maliki views himself to be the only qualified options, thereby making everyone else a poltical obstacle. In truth, no one is indispensible in any government. People may take steps to legitimize assertions that favor their rule while the loss of great leaders can be huge obstacles, but democracy and proper governance depend on no one man. Iraq’s leaders need to be interested in leading and solving problems in order to govern, thus Iraq will either find leaders interested in proper governance through its democracy or fail from a lack of proper governance due to politics. Since the World War II era, the United States military has grown consistently better at two things: eliminating threats from the air and providing humanitarian aid from the air. The Obama Administration’s decision to bomb Islamic State targets in Northern Iraq and provide relief supplies to tens of thousands of Yazidis hiding in the Sinjar Mountain from the jihadist fighters, who seek to eliminate the small religious order, certainly took advantage of these specialties for the right reasons. Given the threat the Islamic State posses to the stability of the Middle East, broad national/regional support for such intervention, the Iraqi military’s apparent willingness to finally cooperative with Kurdish force, and the low cost, low risk nature of a bombing campaign, expanding this type of intervention to include other parts of Iraq and other countries under siege by the Islamic State would normally be the best option.
Unfortunately, the cost of the protracted Iraq War and the many lessons learned weighs heavily on the minds of Americans, especially considering the Iraqi government’s ongoing failure to govern effectively in an inclusive manner. That said, the targeted bombing of Islamic State heavy weapons and vehicles is a meaningful way the United States can limit the damage done by the Islamic State’s militant expansion. Just as the Taliban were able to conquer Afghanistan and impose their strict interpretation of Islam onto the entire population of Afghanistan by using relentless threats of violence to suppress the country’s economic and cultural development, the Islamic State could, ultimately, be ushering in a supersized Afghanistan, i.e. a failing state. With all of the threats and dangers that have come from Afghanistan, including the sheltering of Al Qaeda, groups like the Islamic State should not be allowed to possess high powered weapons as they are more than willing to use them to burn the world to the ground. There is, however, the Sunni issue. While the US is attempting to frame America’s intervention in Iraq as a humanitarian effort, which may well be a goal the Obama Administration is achieving, jihadist and jihadist sympathizers are particularly good at framing American action in ways that demonize and rally support against the United States. With America’s special relationship to Israel in the spotlight due to the ongoing fighting between Israel and Hamas, which is Sunni, America’s uneasy relationship with Sunni dominated Pakistan, America’s invasion of Sunni Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, America’s war against Sunni Al Qaeda, and the fact the Islamic State is a Sunni militant group motivated by the Shiite dominated Iraqi government’s failure to address Sunni interests, there is a very compelling case for Sunnis that the US, the West, and the rest of the Middle East have declared war on Sunnis. Even if Middle Eastern governments support US intervention, the views of average Middle Eastern must be considered while the United States needs to take steps to discredit the notion that the US is targeting Sunnis as failing to do so opens the doors to reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the fact the Obama Administration has framed US intervention in Iraq as a humanitarian effort and there is concern Russia may use the guise of humanitarian intervention to invade Ukraine, there needs to be a careful distinction made. Going back to Russian 2008 invasion of George, as one example among many, Russian leaders tend to view Western action as hypocritical and use our failures to properly justify Western intervention, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, to aggressively act on its interests. Consequently, it is very important to differentiate between potential Russian action in Ukraine and Iraq. Clearly, the Iraqi government, including all conflicting parties, want US intervention while we are acting to protect populations facing genocide. Militant pro-Russian separatists can, however, depart from Ukraine, so the Ukrainian government will no longer need to fight near populated areas. More importantly, the pro-Russian separatists are the initiators of the conflict, just as the Islamic State fighters are, while the Ukrainian government would be more than willing to allow humanitarian monitoring and intervention from countries not closely aligned with Russia. Islamic State fighters are threatening and attacking anyone who will not conform to their views. |
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